In its 2017 appraisal of the top schools globally, the Center for World University Rankings places City College, whose student population represents 89.6% of the world’s 193 sovereign states, in the top 1.2%.

In its 2017 appraisal of the top schools globally, the Center for World University Rankings places City College, whose student population represents 89.6% of the world’s 193 sovereign states, in the top 1.2%.

Seven senior colleges and five community colleges at The City University of New York dominated the Chronicle of Higher Education’s top 10 lists of public U.S. campuses with the greatest success in moving low-income students into the middle class. In a separate global assessment of college quality using totally different criteria, three CUNY colleges placed among the top 1,000 colleges among the 27,770 analyzed worldwide.

The Chronicle’s list was drawn from a widely reported study of colleges’ impact on social mobility by a team led by Stanford University economics professor Raj Chetty. Their 2017 paper, “Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility” tracked students from nearly every U.S. college, including nongraduates, and measured their subsequent earnings against millions of anonymous tax filings and financial-aid records. They looked to see how well colleges helped students whose parents were in the bottom 20 percent of income levels reach the top 20 percent for individual earnings.

CUNY’s social-mobility track record also factored in Money magazine’s July ranking of five CUNY senior campuses in the top quarter of its “Best Colleges for Your Money”: Baruch College, Brooklyn College, Queens College, Hunter College and John Jay College of Criminal Justice. Money measured colleges by 27 criteria.

“The Chronicle’s and Money’s emphasis on how colleges help propel students up the economic ladder speaks to CUNY’s strength and mission since 1847,” said Chancellor James B. Milliken. “It is also increasingly viewed as one of the most important contributions higher education can make if it is truly to serve as a means of achieving equity. All of us at CUNY take great pride in the University's role in helping generations of low-income, underrepresented and immigrant students succeed.”

In Fall 2016, 42.2 percent of CUNY students overall came from households earning less than $20,000; at the senior colleges, 37.1 percent came from such households, while at community colleges, it was 52.9 percent.

The seven CUNY baccalaureate-level colleges in the top 10 were Baruch College, No.1; City College, No. 2; John Jay College of Criminal Justice, No. 4; City Tech, No. 6; Brooklyn College, No. 7; Hunter College, No. 9; and Queens College, No. 10.

The five CUNY associate-level colleges were Borough of Manhattan Community College, No. 3; LaGuardia Community College, No. 5; Bronx Community College, No. 6; Queensborough Community College, No. 8; and Kingsborough Community College, No. 9.

In the global rankings, the Center for World University Rankings (CWUR) says it “publishes the only global university rankings that measure the quality of education and training of students as well as the prestige of the faculty members and the quality of their research without relying on surveys and university data submissions,” as prominent ranking services like U.S. News & World Report do.

CWUR does not consider the Chetty data or similar measures at all. Rather, it gives 25 percent weight each to alumni who are CEOs at top world companies, alumni who won major international awards, and the number of faculty who won international awards, all relative to the university’s size. It gives 5 percent weight each to the number of faculty research papers; their influence as measured by publication in “highly influential” journals; citations measured by the number of highly cited research papers; broad impact as measured by the “h-index,” an author-level metric that attempts to measure both the productivity and citation impact of an author’s publications; and patents, as measured by the number of international patent applications.

Assessing 27,770 degree-granting institutions, CWUR placed three CUNY colleges in the top 1,000: City College, No. 323, in the top 1.2 percent in the world; Hunter College, No. 929, in the top 3.4 percent in the world; and Queens College, No. 955, in the top 3.5 percent in the world.

The City University of New York is the nation’s leading urban public university. Founded in 1847, the University comprises 24 institutions: 11 senior colleges, seven community colleges, William E. Macaulay Honors College at CUNY, CUNY Graduate Center, CUNY Graduate School of Journalism, CUNY School of Law, CUNY School of Professional Studies and CUNY Graduate School of Public Health and Health Policy. The University serves more than 272,000 degree-seeking students. College Now, the University’s academic enrichment program, is offered at CUNY campuses and more than 400 high schools throughout the five boroughs. The University offers online baccalaureate and master’s degrees through the School of Professional Studies.

CCNY Psychologists Develop New Model - Links Emotions and Mental Health

For decades psychologists have studied how people regulate emotions using a multitude of ways to conceptualize and assess emotion regulation. Now a recent study published this week in the journal PLOS ONE by Elliot Jurist and David M. Greenberg of The City College of New York, shows how a new assessment model can give clinicians an exciting new way to think about clinical diagnoses including anxiety, mood, and developmental disorders.    

The authors developed the Mentalized Affectivity Scale (MAS) – a novel assessment model which breaks emotion regulation into three elements:

  • Identifying: the ability to identify emotions and to reflect on the factors that influence them (e.g. childhood events)
  • Processing: the ability to modulate and distinguish complex emotions
  • Expressing: the tendency to express emotions outwardly or inwardly
The novel MAS model linked emotion regulation to personality and wellbeing in surprising and unexpected ways.

The novel MAS model linked emotion regulation to personality and wellbeing in surprising and unexpected ways.

Jurist and Greenberg administered the MAS to nearly 3,000 adults online. Statistical modeling of the results showed: processing emotions delineates from identifying them and expressing emotions delineates from processing them.

The team of psychologists also found that emotion regulation was linked to personality and wellbeing in surprising and unexpected ways and that the ability to process and modulate emotions was a positive predictor of wellbeing beyond personality and demographic information. As the accompanying chart shows, one of the most important findings was how the three elements linked to the participants’ prior clinical diagnoses across anxiety, mood, eating, and neurodevelopmental disorders.

“We have introduced a way for psychologists and psychiatrists to use emotion regulation to supplement diagnoses,” said Greenberg, the lead author who is a postdoc student at Colin Powell School for Civic and Global Leadership.

Jurist, the senior author and director of the Mentalized Affectivity Lab at CCNY and Professor at the Colin Powell School for Civic and Global Leadership said: “For the first time we have empirical evidence for the validity and usefulness of the theory that can be carried out into the mainstream by neuroscientists, emotion researchers and psychiatrists.”

North Korea: Time to Think Beyond Denuclearization

Article by rajan menon REPost from

Article by rajan menon
REPost from

In September, the United Nations Security Council imposed, unanimously, its toughest economic sanctions yet on North Korea. The goal: inducing Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, including the warheads it has accumulated, which are estimated to number between a dozen to 30, perhaps more. Laudable though the goal of “denuclearization” may be, and President Donald Trump’s promises notwithstanding, it has become a pipedream. Kim Jong-un will never part with his nuclear weapons cache, which the regime has developed doggedly, and despite international condemnation and pressure, over decades. It’s time to accept this reality.

It was one thing to try and terminate Pyongyang’s nuclear arms program when it had yet to produce warheads and long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering them— the goal of the ' negotiated between the Clinton administration and the government of Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un’s father, as well as of the 2003-2007 Six-Party Talks under President George W. Bush— but now that North Korea has nuclear arms, neither pressure nor rewards will work.

Kim Jong-un takes the possibility of the United States attempting “regime change” by military means seriously—and all the more given Trump’s rhetoric. Kim and his senior officials point to the fate of Saddam Hussein and Mu'ammar Gadaffi as proof that North Korea needs the ultimate deterrent. Pyongyang is doubtless adept at propaganda, but that is not a reason to dismiss everything it says as false, especially because North Korea no longer trusts China to defend it and probably hasn’t in decades—and Saddam and Gadaffi, the latter after he agreed to dismantle his nuclear arms program, are history.

Furthermore, no state that has developed nuclear weapons has been willing to part with them. Pyongyang certainly won’t be the first to do so. Instead, it will weather the economic sanctions and political condemnation: think of India and Pakistan. Moreover, China and Russia cannot be counted on to increase the pressure to the point that Kim’s regime could collapse, leading to unpredictable consequences on their borders.

And for all of President Donald Trump’s rants directed at “Little Rocket Man,” there’s no way to destroy North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile sites without courting the calamity of Kim attacking South Korea with his numerous artillery pieces and short-range missiles, killing tens of thousands of South Koreans (as well as Chinese and Americans living in Seoul) in minutes. Greater Seoul, let’s remember, has a population of over 25 million, making it the world’s fifth largest conurbation.

Managing a nuclear North Korea means, concretely, maximizing the probability that deterrence will work—that Pyongyang will not use its nuclear arms because it understands that if it does the United States will respond in kind, eviscerating the North Korean state.

Despite the shibboleth that Kim is irrational and thus beyond the realm of deterrence, he has never done anything that suggests that he is prone to suicide. What conceivable political goal would be achieved by launching a nuclear attack on South Korea and Japan, to say nothing of the United States?

One way to strengthen deterrence is to create a hot-line-like system that links North Korea, Russia, and China. It would enable instantaneous communications among the leaders of these countries and reduce the probability that a military crisis on the Korean peninsula could careen out of control and lead to nuclear war.

An additional measure—which would certainly be politically controversial in the West and challenging given Pyongyang’s obsession with secrecy—would involve providing North Korea the technological assistance it needs to avert the possibility that its leaders, fearing a decapitating first strike, might launch their nuclear weapons because North Korean early warning systems falsely reported an incoming nuclear attack. If you think this is the stuff of sci-fi novels and movies, peruse Scott Sagan’s Limits of Safety, a chilling account of the erroneous warnings from American detection systems about a Soviet nuclear strike.

As a third step, the United States would make clear that, while it will not pursue regime change, any attack launched by North Korea on Japan, South Korea, or an American territory would be met with an overwhelming military response.

These three measures could be supplemented with an end to patrols over South Korea and international waters off North Korea by American nuclear-capable B-1B bombers, a reduction in the frequency of U.S.-South Korean military exercises, the normalization of political relations between Washington and Pyongyang. The timing and sequencing of these steps would, of course, be hammered out in negotiations and can’t be formulated a priori. To set the stage for the difficult talks that achieving all this will surely require, calming the now-stormy waters by accepting the Chinese and Russian freeze-for-freeze (Pyongyang suspends its ballistic missile tests in exchange for Washington and Seoul suspending their military exercises) would make sense: It is hard to see a downside.

The measures should be supplemented by efforts to reduce the chances of a non-nuclear war between North and South Korea. These could include verifiable agreements under which each side pulls its forces further back from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), refrains from deploying armaments in the vacated zones, provides advance notification for military exercises and troops movements above a certain size, reconfigures its forces so that initiating standing-start attacks becomes more difficult, and reduces the number of tanks, artillery pieces, and short-range missiles. Given that the numerical balance (though not when it comes to the quality of weaponry) favors the North, it would undertake steeper reductions, save in combat aircraft (and frigates and destroyers, but the focus of the cuts would be on land and air forces), where South Korea has the quantitative edge. But other parts of the deal should provide Pyongyang incentives to accept deeper cuts in its forces.

To be sure, getting talks going on implementing these measures, let alone actualizing them, won’t be easy, not least because of the longstanding animosity between North Korea and the United States. Yet Washington has conducted talks and normalized relations with more than one dictatorship before (think of Mao’s China in the early 1970s, when the blood-drenched Cultural Revolution has not yet concluded), so it is senseless to refuse negotiations with North Korea on the grounds that its human rights record is appalling.

North Korea has advanced toward an operational nuclear capability much faster than experts had anticipated. True, it needs to take additional steps, such as the miniaturizing its warheads and ensuring that they are not destroyed by the heat and vibration they will encounter upon reentering the earth’s atmosphere. But it is a safe bet that Pyongyang will clear these hurdles, so it is more realistic to abandon the objective of getting North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons and to ensure military stability in a world that, like it or not, will feature a nuclear-armed North Korea.

To coming around to this strategy, Washington will have to abandon the maxims that have long governed official thinking—under Democrats and Republican administrations alike. That will be tough, but then we are in a tough spot and the stakes are high—and the old remedies just won’t work.